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C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000047

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND  
AF/C  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON  
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: HOW TO ADVANCE SECURITY MECHANISMS IN DARFUR, IN  
THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In the absence of an effective ceasefire agreement and with UN/DPKO reportedly blocking UNAMID's ceasefire monitoring plan, our best hope may be to push forward with the US Darfur Monitoring Plan, which can be used to more aggressively investigate security incidents and encourage further dialogue between the government and the rebels on security issues. According to UNAMID's polchief, JSR Adada and MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq agreed in a meeting January 13 that the US plan may be the best way forward. Mohammed also suggested additional ideas for enhancing security on the ground in Darfur in the absence of an effective formal ceasefire agreement. End summary.

¶2. (C) UNAMID polchief Abdul Mohammed told polchief January 13 that UN/DPKO is blocking UNAMID's ceasefire monitoring plan "because there is currently no ceasefire to monitor." Mohammed and UNAMID Joint Special Representative (JSR) Adada had just finished a meeting with MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq to discuss the ceasefire plan. Mohammed reported that Adada and Siddiq discussed the fact that UN/DPKO is blocking UNAMID's plan due to lack of progress on the peace negotiations front. According to Mohammed (we will confirm this in separate meetings with Adada and Siddiq in the coming days) Siddiq suggested allowing the US Darfur Monitoring Plan to go forward if UNAMID would not be able to move forward with a plan of its own. Reportedly, both saw the value of getting some sort of mechanism in place to move the process forward.

¶3. (C) Mohammed reported that he also plans to broaden the discussions of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) to include local-level security mechanisms including conflict resolution and prevention between tribal groups in Darfur. He recognized that UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole should have the lead on ceasefire negotiations between the rebel groups and the government, but said he believes the DDDC (which he heads, in addition to serving as the interim UNAMID polchief) could be used to gather grass roots and tribal support for improved localized security mechanisms on the ground in Darfur.

¶4. (C) Commen: In the absence of a ceasefire agreement, there is still much that can be done to improve security arrangements between the parties by deploying a more robust monitoring mechanism (as envisioned by the US-proposed DMT) and by working on localized security arrangements between tribes and factionalized armed groups including rebels and Arab militia. With regard to localized arrangements, this actually happens informally every year during the migratory season when tribal chiefs and local government official

(sometimes with support from national figures) discuss security arrangements prior to the migration in order to prevent conflict. With regard to a ceasefire/conflict monitoring mechanism, there is of course nothing to prevent UNAMID from getting more aggressive on its own and more quickly investigating incidents as well as negotiating further security protocols with the government and armed groups on a bilateral basis - nothing except the fact that UNAMID has been incredibly timid and uncreative in this regard, and constantly needs a push forward. The US/DMT proposal had the effect of spurring UNAMID to begin thinking about a plan, but now it appears to be stalled in New York; this would be worth verifying with officials at UN/DPKO. The US/DMT proposal would also have the effect of adding staff officers on a contract basis who would provide much-needed capacity to UNAMID's beleaguered and limited staff officer corps. CDA Fernandez will meet with JSR Adada and MFA U/S Siddiq separately next week to discuss these proposals further and gauge the level of UNAMID and GOS support for the US Darfur Monitoring Plan. End comment.

FERNANDEZ